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Abstract

It is my intention with this thesis to effectively describe what is known about Early
Intervention systems to date. Many sources of information are used, beginning with peer reviewed
journals such as Justice Quarterly, Police Quarterly, Policing: An International Journal of Police
Strategies & Management, Police and Society and The American Journal of Criminal Justice. Also
reports from criminal justice research affiliates will be used like the National Institute of Justice
and the National Criminal Justice Reference Service. This thesis will work toward creating a
comprehensive outline of the history of EI and future possibilities. With the aid of extant research,
inquiries into the effectiveness of various EI systems, their shortcomings, or even best practices
will be addressed. The aim is to review the existing discussion essentially paving the way for future
researchers to conduct primary research studies on EI effectiveness. By accumulating, and
subsequently compiling available research, the hope is to identify key arguments and perspectives
on these systems and their implementation.
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Introduction
There is something to be said about being in control: the word itself speaks both to the
power of influence over others, as well as an ability to supervise how something is run. It is only
natural that those who are given power should also be supervised. The tragedy of abuse which can
occur when power is left unchecked has, and continues, to be seen. As a developed nation, the
struggle between power and liberty is constant. In this metaphor, police accountability holds a
significant place among those gaps. Policing is the primary force of formal social control in our
nation, occupying a rare position, which is authorized to forcibly require others to comply should
the situation call for such (Bittner, 1970). The potential for abuse of power is high. Over time,
discussions of police culture, discretion, professionalism, and the like have persisted (Walker,
Alpert, & Kenny, 2004). Each continues to contribute necessary controls to curb abuse and to
ensure liberty has its place among security and protection. However, these explanations continue
to foster a void, one which leads to the extensive study of police accountability and methods of
reform. While excessive force or physical abuse of authority in policing is not the sole impetus for
the advent of police reform, they are both major players. It should be noted that this ‘violence’ is
a relative term when it comes to policing – having its place neatly between compliance and abuse;
that is to say a continuum of force is in place which outlines what response is acceptable, which
may be necessary, and when a threshold has been crossed into that which is excessive (Terrill,
2001). With the progression of time even more issues have emerged.
Underdeveloped areas in both policy and departmental values continue to weaken
accountability measures, which require reform. This might be exemplified by the many
governmental or independent reviews and interventions in both policing and the criminal justice
1

system. For example, the Christopher Commission was an independent study of the Los Angeles
Police Department during April of 1993 in the wake of the Rodney King incident (Independent
Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991). This commission identified that a
small group of officers were responsible for the majority, or a disproportionate number, of
complaints within the department. As a result, the ‘bad apple’ theory of policing emerged whereby
the select few misrepresent the department as a whole and weaken social cohesion with the
surrounding community (Harris, 2009). Implementation of this theory is exemplified by the
accountability system used by the Chicago Police Department becoming known as the “Bad Apple
Picker.” This system attributes numerical values to risk factors which flag the possibility of future
misconduct among officers and in turn predicts if and when an officer might need to receive
counseling (Stix, 1994). Also of note is Section 14141, a provision of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. This act was passed by Congress - motivated by a desire to
‘rope in’ police departments who had been “engaged in patterns or practices of conduct…which
deprived persons of rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution” (Davis,
Henderson, and Ortiz, 2005, p. 41). Under the jurisdiction of the attorney general, it allowed the
federal government to intervene on behalf of the state and reform area police departments utilizing
either consent decrees (serving a supervisory role to curb misconduct through change) or the more
conciliatory Memorandum of Agreements (serving to counsel departments to create a strategy of
reform) (Ross, & Parke, 2009).
A relatively recent idea has emerged among police organizations: the implementation of
Early Warning (EW) systems, later referred to as Early Intervention (EI) systems. These systems
are meant to monitor officers on a variety of factors. Should an individual gain multiple
2

infractions by the varying system standards, s/he is flagged and referred for review or sanction
depending upon the particular department’s policy. However, reviews of such systems have
noted that informal measures are more common (Walker, 2005a).
The question remains, are there effective EI/EW systems? The notion of a system like
this is not completely foreign to ideas of police accountability. The need itself for evidencebased management systems may have been realized as early as when the Department of Justice
sought to observe police departments in pursuit of their external oversight of them (Henderson &
Ortiz, 2005). In fact, Chicago’s “Bad-Apple Picker” may have paved the way for assigning
numerical weight to factors of evaluation, with respect to officer accountability, for determining
if intervention is needed.
Regardless, the culmination of these events, interventions, and change in best practices
have created an environment conducive to the introduction of systems such as EI in policing. It is
in this way that the aforementioned changing landscape in policing would become responsible for
facilitating their introduction. This would further alter the environment of policing, sparking
newfound interest in researching these topics, and finding even better solutions such as the shift
from individual discipline to a broader focus on creating an environment of professionalism that
far outstrips the initial goals of those responsible for professional police reform in the 1970’s
(Walker, 2005b). With the remembrance of flashpoint instances such as Rodney King, or the more
recent events of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri and Eric Garner in New York City, police
accountability has consistently been called into question by governmental entities, the public, and
the media.
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It is the purpose of this thesis to assess what is known on EI systems as an accountability
tool in policing, as well as their capabilities or overall effectiveness. Due to the novelty of EI and
its lack of widespread research, this thesis will serve not only as a review of existing knowledge,
but an attempt to identify the overarching themes surrounding this measure as both an
accountability mechanism and a measure of performance. It is the aim of this research that
identifiable themes will emerge as a result - alluding to the state of research surrounding EI
systems, where they are lacking, why they may be lacking, how they have been implemented, or
any other relevant material that may give future research a better idea of what has been empirically
verified and areas that may still require conclusive findings.
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Literature on EI Systems
EI systems, like EW systems before them, are designed to monitor and respond to
potentially problematic police behavior before it escalates to full blown abuses of authority. As
will be discussed later, these systems include a number of behavioral indicators, thresholds for
unacceptable levels across such indicators, and interventions designed to then remedy such.
Existing research does attest to their effectiveness. Walker (2003) suggests that EI as an
accountability tool fills the needs of departments today by effectively reforming problem officers
(p. 3-52). Still others call for further research on EI systems, or outline the extreme lack of research
on them (Sharback, 2015; Walker, 2001; Walker, & Milligan, 2006). The reason for this is that
many aspects of these systems are still being debated. For example, Walker et al. (2001) have
begun examining the levels of commitment required by administrators in these systems as well as
effective indicators to be used by them. This is necessary because it has been found that many
police reforms have failed to endure over time; EI being no exception. Chanin (2014), specifically,
has noted that the failure of many systems to do just that is because they require an
institutionalization of reform in order to last. This institutionalization is not unique to EI systems,
however, departmental commitment required by EI systems is of a unique higher importance as it
is a central component in ensuring the reform is actively utilized and not simply fading away over
time. This burden may rest wholly on administration or can just as likely be a responsibility of
everyone within the department.
Other areas lacking research include how indicators (of potentially problematic behavior)
might be determined. Kim, Bazely, and Mieczkowski (2006) have evaluated what indicators may
be effective by comparing them to subsequent results and successes in the EI systems. Others have
5

explored issues of reliability within indicators which are a part of EI systems: for example,
McCluskey and Terrill (2005) when they assess the nature of citizen complaints and their
relationship to both perceived and actual levels of coercion utilized by officers, as well as how an
arrestee’s or onlooker’s perspective may color certain actions. Another is White and Kane (2013),
when they examine protective and risk factors of officers and their relation to pathways of careerending police misconduct. Also Harris (2009), when he examines how issues in performance peak
alongside variability within an officer’s proneness to continue to exhibit problem behaviors or to
cease having behavioral issues altogether. Each take on different aspects of behavioral analysis of
officers and what kind of implications they may have as far as predicting future misconduct or
how questionable their reliability may be as indicators. This information may lend itself to finding
better evaluative indicators for EI systems.
While the bulk of the research is concerned with that listed above, or the effectiveness of
the system altogether, it is not the only thing researchers are exploring. For instance, some have
inquired as to how these systems aid departments that have failed themselves. Davis, Henderson,
and Ortiz (2005) do so when exploring if federal intervention could bring lasting improvement –
the authors explain that many departments instituting systems to track officer performance and
behavior allow for external entities to effectively monitor and control departmental behavior (p.
40-42). Others echo this claim when examining federal intervention, such as Ross and Parke
(2009), in pointing out the importance of data driven information management systems to aid those
interventions.
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A Closer Look into the Advent of EW and EI Systems
The notion of early warning itself is not unique to policing, but over time has spanned
numerous disciplines and purposes (e.g., extreme weather, vector-borne disease outbreak,
geological hazards, environmental degradation) dealing with both natural and human-induced
hazards (Glantz, 2004). However, within policing, EI is something which has been cited and
utilized since the 1970s – beginning with both the Miami and Miami Dade County police (Walker,
2005a). These departments have the oldest and longest used systems of their type as compared to
any other intervention system. Additional forms of EI systems were short lived, with even fewer
having survived to the present (Archbold, 2013). With time, the base of research within this area
of police accountability, while small, has been slowly expanding. As of now, there are a handful
of researchers who have created detailed information sources on the implementation of EI systems
and their uses (e.g., Walker, 2005; Walker & Milligan, 2006.). Endorsements of EI systems by
organizations of deference in the criminal justice field also exist (e.g., U.S. Department of Justice,
2001; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1981; International Association of Chiefs of Police
[IACP], 2009.).
With early intervention being applied to criminals, such as the large base of study for crime
prevention (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary), and juveniles, like “scared-straight programs”,
it might be unrealistic to think that this philosophy would not also reach policing. Even more so
as it remains an area where reform has yet to completely quell the issues of abuse of authority
and/or corruption within departments (Stephens, 2011). Some have even described these systems
as the ‘new paradigm’ of accountability. That is, one which replaces external punishment with
institutionalized professionalism and formal sanction with informal treatment; inadvertently the
7

success of these systems both create and rely on an enhanced sense of accountability within the
department (Walker, 2003). This paradigm shift is characterized by the coming together of past
reform efforts, techniques, and discipline measures.
With this shift, and with accountability growing into popular practice, many new
implementations have taken place – both literally and in the ideals which are popularly represented.
For example, accountability used to be reactive and half-hearted stopgap measures. Whereas they
now have evolved within many departments to instead help each become self-aware, selfmonitoring, and proactive in preventing issues relating to lack of accountability. The advent of EI
systems could be termed just one expression of such, but it is of current the one which is of most
interest to this thesis.
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Defining the relationship between EI systems and EW systems
Often times EI systems and EW systems are presented as one in the same. The terms may
even be used interchangeably; however, there are subtle differences. EW systems have been
defined as a “tool designed to identify officers whose behavior is problematic and to provide a
form of intervention to correct that behavior” (Hughes & Andre, 2007). EI systems are defined as
a “performance database that permits police managers to identify officers with patterns of
problematic conduct and then to provide specially tailored interventions designed to correct those
conduct problems” (Walker, 2003). When taking the above into account, it could be said that there
are few differences between the two; this is true. However, each go by different names. The reason
is that EI systems have come to replace EW systems in name as well as with a modified purpose.
Early intervention serves as a euphemism suggesting the modernized conceptualization of these
systems and their purpose. This is meant to reorient them from a system of punishment to the more
proactive and rehabilitative nature they are meant to take on. The simple change of name is meant
to communicate just that and to eliminate any negative connotation either within research circles
or police departments in which the system is implemented (Walker, 2005). It should be noted that
definitions of EI systems make special mention of things such as ‘specially tailored’ interventions
and the inclusion of police managers as an integral part of the system. EI also seems to place a
larger emphasis on computerized systems or at least the data-gathering methods they employ. This
may be explained by the modern current in policing research which advocates researching what
matters. As a result, many studies utilize tangible figures of measurement (e.g., arrest data,
COMPSTAT data, use of force data), which will then be used to gauge levels of the
institutionalization and effectiveness of organizational reform (Chanin, 2014). As these systems
9

have developed, they are no longer limited to issues of misconduct, but have also instituted an
ability to track officer performance; including when an officer is performing well. This can be seen
in the systems’ ability to recognize high-performing officers, track trends in officer behavior to
indicate important changes, and perhaps even differentiate between officers who are productive
and those who are abusing power (e.g., due to varied levels of activity, jurisdiction size, and
assignment) (Walker, 2007). To that end, the importance of data driven information management
systems has been cited by some as crucial to providing useful information about the activities of
officers and supervisors within a police department (Ross & Parke, 2009). This alludes to a use
not only as an accountability mechanism, but as a research tool as well.
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Research Strategy and Aims
It is the intention of this thesis to effectively describe what is known about EI systems to
date. Many sources of information are used, beginning with peer reviewed journals such as Justice
Quarterly, Police Quarterly, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies &
Management, Police and Society and The American Journal of Criminal Justice. Also reports from
criminal justice research affiliates will be used like the National Institute of Justice and the
National Criminal Justice Reference Service. While many have utilized existing research to
speculate on the benefits or shortcomings of EI systems, this thesis works toward creating a
comprehensive outline of the history of EI and future possibilities. With the aid of extant research,
inquiries into the effectiveness of various EI systems, their shortcomings, or even best practices
will be addressed. The aim is to review the existing discussion essentially paving the way for future
researchers to conduct primary studies on EI effectiveness. By accumulating, and subsequently
compiling available research, the hope is to identify key arguments and perspectives on these
systems and their implementation. It is plainly observable that existing research occupies a niche
which goes largely untouched. In fact, given recent events and the renewed scrutiny of police
departments nationwide, a study such as this is timely. Now that a general idea of what these
systems are and may be capable of, it is important to take a deeper look into the considerations
needed in order to further establish them.

11

The Structural Components of EI Systems
EI Indicators
While the systematic process of EI systems follow similar patterns of planning and design
as risk management and crime prevention models, its dynamic nature and reliance on constant reevaluation requires a greater attention to detail. Criteria of selection, known as indicators, for
which officers may qualify for intervention may stand alone or may simply be a factor in a larger
calculus of evaluation (Gibbs & Kendrick, 2011; Hussey, 2002). For instance, while an excessive
amount of use of force may stand as a single indicator, other elements such as leaving shifts early
may need to be coupled with factors such as an inclination towards binge drinking, a decline in
sociability, and increases in vehicular damage to suggest need for intervention.
However, compiling and subsequently grouping factors may not be the only way to ensure
accurate predictions of problem behavior. Ede, Homel, and Prenzler (2002) found that single
factors, like officer complaints, could be differentiated by unit size, which they referred to as task
environments, and then analyzed by concentration and prevalence. In this way high concentrations
of complaints denoted a small group responsible for a majority of the complaints and a high
prevalence suggested a more diffuse problem stemming from something such as negative
workplace culture. The latter changes mere statistical data into information that is carefully
calculated to be even more useful: a viable alternative to simply expanding an EI system’s
indicators. As such, the system contends with only a few indicators but at the same time ensures
each is carefully considered to be most effective. Macintyre, Prenzler, and Chapman (2008)
explain their version of this process as strategic intelligence. They make the argument that any
factor of evaluation of officer behavior can be effective but must be coupled with as much
12

information as possible in order to be actionable and/or accurate. The differing views among
scholars here sheds light on a deeper problem which continues to plague EI systems: a need for
marker-behavior indicators which would accurately identify problem officers. To be more precise,
this would mean accurate indicators for identifying an at-risk officer. It is yet to be seen if this
means an increase in indicators considered, exhaustive information collection when utilizing a
single indicator, or a more in-depth evaluation process. It is most likely some combination of each
and will largely depend on a departments needs and considerations. At the very least, many
departments have realized an EI system cannot function effectively off of one statistical criterion.
In fact, research has continually occupied itself with a strong focus on indicators utilized
(e.g., Alpert & Walker, 2000; Andre, 2007; Macintyre, et al., 2008; Moore, 2003). This is meant
to ensure that an increase in or violation of any system indicator is a clear sign of growing
behavioral issues rather than some special circumstance. This is evidenced by the fact that even
major staples of EI systems have their criticisms. Arnold (2001) serves as one of those critics with
his thoughts on officer complaints as an evaluation tool for officer behavior. In his report he states
that use of citizen complaints is “one of the most badly abused police-based statistics” (p.82). For
instance, we might acknowledge the many complaints which are not sustained. Other perspectives
offer similar claims, such as Moore (2003) when referencing the San Jose Police Department’s EI
system which is strictly complaint driven (i.e. number of officer complaints received by the
Internal Affairs unit). He states that such a system encounters an extreme lacking in a capacity to
capture a variety of other at-risk behaviors for officers. Both of these mark the body of research
which suggests EI systems have an obligation to track multiple and varied indicators to be
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worthwhile. We might make note of Walker who has found many existing systems utilize as few
as eight or as many as 24 indicators (Walker, 2005a).
Moving forward, many proponents have also stated that the selection of these indicators
should be individualized within each department – but this may stand as more of a necessity than
best practice. The effectiveness of EI systems hinge on the very definition of “early”, described by
Walker and Alpert (2000) as “the sense that a department acts on the basis of performance
indicators that do not necessarily warrant formal disciplinary action” (p. 60). This is as opposed to
an ex post facto disciplinary review. If factors which are utilized by a department’s EI system fail
to capture those officers prone to future misconduct, fail to alert central or localized management
personnel in a timely manner, or incorrectly flag officers who have no expectation of future
misconduct, the very purpose of the system will have been undermined (Lersch, Bazley, &
Mieczkowski, 2009). Rippling effects could essentially cripple faith in the system, lessen
commitment by first-line supervisors, slow departmental funding, or waste valuable resources with
nothing to show in return.
The Varying Types of EI Indicators
When discussing specific indicators there is no single list. In fact, this is part of the reason
for which EI systems are so varied and generalized study has proved so elusive. At the same time
though, indicators in an EI system usually includes much of what one might expect. Paul Schultz
(1993) points this out when stating “the most commonly included indicators are citizen complaints,
use-of-force reports, and firearm discharges” (p. 2). In a national study based on 243 departments
that utilized EI, Paoline, Worden, McLean, & Krupa (2015), note the most common factors among
all that are implemented were: citizen complaints, non-lethal force, internal complaints, vehicle
14

damage/accidents, and internal investigation. However, systems which are more complex go even
further in the types of things they monitor, such as deficiencies in report writing, poor preparation
for court appearances, and even sick time (Hussey, 2002).
Larger systems take into account even broader facets of officer behavior. One example of
such broader focuses may include the officer’s social temperament towards his/her department
(Gibbs & Kendrick, 2011). To elaborate, if an officer is constantly turning in poor reports it may
not signify a behavioral issue explicitly, but it could signal a drop in morale, a distaste for his/her
department, a lack of precision in following protocol or any number of things that mean the officer
has lost motivation to do things properly or to accurately carry out job responsibilities. Thus, these
larger systems function as ones which not only track officer interactions with the public at large,
but also attempt to evaluate the individual personally. These more far-reaching factors may even
uncover an officer who is unhappy. This is something especially important since continued
unhappiness can translate to cynicism, improper behavior, corrupt behavior, or possibly excessive
use of force. To further this point, consider Fyfe’s (2005) distinction between extralegal violence
(popularly termed brutality) and unnecessary force. While the first is a willful and knowing
exertion of force beyond the bounds of proper police conduct, the other is a result of ineptitude or
carelessness resulting in force applied too hastily or needlessly and absent a malicious intention
(pp.165-180). Such far-reaching indicators, mentioned above, may do well to capture the inept or
discouraged officer more prone to force applied due to a lack of care or concern whereas those
considered core to EI systems may lend themselves to more pressing matters such as a prejudiced
officer. The overall point is, even less targeted indicators may hold value as far as identifying
officers who may have some sort of problem.
15

Why Move Towards a Comprehensive List of EI Indicators?
Unfortunately, present research is still trying to specify what indicators can or should be
used in an EI system. It is unclear if this will result in some agreed upon list or varying
recommendations. In the case that a comprehensive list of available and effective indicators is
created, it may aid in the implementation and future study of EI systems. The difficult part, then,
lies in establishing said list. To this end much of the research reviewed seems to diverge down two
paths: those which are attempting to understand the policy of EI systems and those looking to
establish their effectiveness (Walker, 2007). Each are equally important because without
established synergy between them neither will be accomplished. For example, simply establishing
use of force as a relative and predictive factor of officer behavior means nothing if policies
establishing use of force only include physical manifestations. This same logic goes for complaints
against an officer as well. If no merit is given to those complaints not sustained, a blind eye may
be turned in a system which only acknowledges sustained complaints while at the same time failing
to account for the fact that complaint processes in the department are archaic and difficult to access.
This very issue occurred in Chicago when a program, in the wake of officer misconduct, was found
to be wholly incompetent (Newman, 2015). Just as effective indicators will be affected by the
thresholds and analysis that surround them (discussed later), they will also be reliant on
departmental policies that they operate in. It could be said that if real ambitions existed to
implement EI systems nationwide, criminal justice personnel will be forced to take on the
variations in departmental policy which has existed unresolved for decades.
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Other newer studies are also trying to delineate what existing EI systems are utilizing most
often when established (Paoline et al., 2015). The hope is that once a more concrete list of measures
has been uncovered, research can focus more pointedly on which of them achieve the following:
-

The predictive utility of the factor(s)

-

The timeliness of the factor(s) in predicting escalations in negative behavior

At this time, it is unknown if studies progressing in the above way will ultimately lead to definitive
evaluations of the effectiveness of any single indicator; at least for the purpose of generalized or
comprehensive study. As current research continues to first establish what indictors are utilized
most often, followed by analysis on the effectiveness of them via quantitative analysis, it may
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As agencies that implement these systems regularly consult
literature on what may serve as standard measures in them, while at the same time later submitting
to survey research, the focus may be narrowed too quickly. For example, a department consults
existing research on EI systems and, as a result, decides to implement indicators X, Y, and Z. This
same department is later recorded in a survey conducted by researchers who will ultimately publish
articles referencing indicators X, Y, and Z. As a result, these indicators have just increased in
prevalence (with regard to their exposure) in an exponential way; to include the original studies
the department had consulted and those resulting from the department’s later study. At some point
they may even be elevated to levels of anonymous acceptance because of this increased prevalence
and, with no standardized list to dispute them, will continue to be implemented further with no
solid foundation to explain why. To clarify, the issue is not so much that those indicators which
are more established in literature will be used more often in a cyclical way, but that other, less
established measures will be ignored when they may be just as beneficial.
17

Regardless, continuing to extrapolate the most common measures of EI systems and later
researching the overall effectiveness of the system may still prove ineffective at assessing the
efficacy of that measure. For example, how would researchers isolate the indicator itself as the
contribution to a successful EI system? To elaborate, the very measurement of something like use
of force alone comes with a long list of academic debate such as how an organization’s policy may
affect its level of reporting, accurate or otherwise. Beyond that, even if we accept use of force as
a consistent measure in and of itself, the efficacy of the indicators within the EI system will also
depend on how they work in concert with established thresholds, as well as the overall evaluation
of said data (such as secondary review). Research should, instead, take more open minded
approaches when examining which factors can serve as viable predictors of officer behavior,
whether by themselves or when combined. This may even lead to certain accepted standards of EI
systems, allowing them to establish accreditation methods for the system.
This type of standardization would still allow for deviations, determined by how indicators
are measured in relation to thresholds and other data analysis techniques, while at the same time
potentially ushering in national implementation of the system. Just as we saw EI systems multiply
in the wake of federal consent decrees and memorandums (Davis, Henderson, and Ortiz, 2004),
we may again see their use at every departmental level if they accomplished increased levels of
standardization. It should not be feared that standardization may inhibit systems’ catering to a
department’s needs as each department would still have discretion over which indicators to choose,
how they are measured, and when or how intervention is administered.
Crafting a comprehensive list of indicators will deal with discrepancies in existing policy
and outlooks within criminal justice personnel early on. By addressing these issues first, once
18

indicators have been selected, it will be known that each come with a certain amount of baggage
(for lack of a better metaphor). It will be plainly put which types of definitions, interpretations in
policy, and considerations must be in place when evaluating an officer on any one indicator or
some combination of them. This allows for a foundation of the system to be established which can
then move forward in adding, refining, or removing indicators which are too broad, ineffective,
too hard to isolate, or too volatile with regard to making accurate and timely officer predictions.
Alternatives in Assessing Indicator Effectiveness
When EI systems were first created, they were based on philosophies of deterrence as well
as some aspects of labeling theories (Alpert & Walker, 2000). Here a combination of stigma,
shame, and intervention would eventually alter the officer’s behavior to socialize him or her toward
more acceptable practices. Granted, this was prior to the reconceptualization of the systems to be
less focused on simply singling out “bad apples.” However, another notable change in the systems
has come about as a result. Systems previously based their indicators on broader, more abstract
things like psychological evaluations. These led to qualitative measures like: “squad concerns
about an officer hurting someone, an officer who has nicknames stemming from the use of forceful
arrests, an officer’s arrestees’ injuries, and an increase in an officer’s insubordinate behavior”
(Andre, 2007, p. 25). As EI systems have evolved into what they are today, they have become even
more efficient in terms of data management techniques and quantitatively focused measures which
are conducive to such (Smith & Austin, 2015). Why is it then that research, still lacking an
identifiable list of accepted indicators, continues moving towards only studying what is currently
in use within EI systems. Likewise, of those guides offering insight into implementing EI systems,
many state that indicators are to be created at the discretion of the department (e.g., Walker, 2005a;
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Schultz, 2012; Walker & Milligan, 2006; OPI, 2008). Perhaps, instead, research should continue
to focus on types of qualitative predictors of officer behavior which can then be operationalized,
quantified, and accurately measured.
By moving through the research process in this way, not only can researchers account for
ways in which other factors may weaken those measures, they may also reach a closer true
definition of how effective those measures are at predicting officer misconduct. It is hardly
coincidence that based on the studies thus far, those indicators which are most prevalent are those
for which the most literature exists as far as how they should be measured, potential biases in their
measures, and how they may lend to predicting officer behavior (Lersch et al., 2009). Again, the
most important factor when selecting indicators within an EI system is their validity and reliability.
If a criterion validity cannot be established first it will not matter in the more specific realm of
being conducive to the departmental needs. If any type of consensus is going to be reached as to
what indicators should be utilized most often in EI systems, regardless of departmental factors and
the like, it might not be found simply studying existing systems. Just as there are cases of success,
there are also cases of failure – none of which can be appropriated entirely to the indicator(s) used.
See Appendix A for a full list of departmental indicators in existing EI systems based on the works
of (Blau, Super, & Brady, 1993; Schultz, 2012; Blau, 1994; Hussey, 2002; San Francisco Police
Department, 2007; Paoline et al., 2015).
Options for Interpreting EI System Data
Moving forward, the way in which each standard of officer behavior is interpreted must be
carefully thought out. For example, an evaluation of early intervention program indicators
conducted by Lersch et al. (2009) revealed that those which were weighed and analyzed as opposed
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to being taken at face value seemed to have a greater accuracy in correctly identifying at-risk
officers. Further, these allowed for a lesser frequency of inappropriately identifying officers whose
conduct, in light of other factors, was not truly in need of intervention. Although this study focused
only on use of force among officers, it speaks to the concept of creating processes and algorithms
for collection of officer criteria as a means of obtaining more accurate and better founded results.
This is best characterized in Worden et al. (2013) when they conclude: “We believe that the current
structure of EI systems is not commensurate with the aspirations that their advocates have for
them” (p. 24). Much of existing research calls for a new focus on the effectiveness of EI systems
as well as more case studies; and for good reason. However, it should not be overlooked that EI
systems have much to research in order to create a system which effectively evaluates complex
criteria, but does so in a way which is streamlined to not inhibit departmental duties. Theoretically,
this would not only increase their effectiveness when later evaluated but would also allow the
introduction of fundamentally sound systems that are easily implemented.
When examining computerized software currently used to implement EI systems,
discussed in depth later, many are simply Internal Affairs technologies that have now been updated
to include EI capabilities. Even though they may allow for some analysis of entered data and
implement simple tally systems for specified indicators, these systems leave most of the analysis
up to those who utilize them. Put best, Stephens (2009) describes them as relational databases of
personnel and complaint information which can then be mined to deduce relationships that might
not otherwise be immediately evident (p.511). Granted, while many of these systems may then be
exported to formats within Microsoft Excel for further analysis, it seems as though they do little
to optimize EI practices. Once the luxury of standardized accepted indicators are created, it is
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important that the focus shift to better options of analysis. Currently, many software systems act
as simple tallies which places a large burden on management and implementing personnel to find
some magic number which will flag officers early and appropriately in light of any number of
considerations. These are termed thresholds and are discussed further in the next section. The point
is, it may be these basic interpretations in data being used, maintained by current software, which
results in some EI system failures.

Thresholds
By utilizing a broad range of effective indicators, the system stands a better chance of
properly identifying officers with a genuinely problematic behavioral issue. At the same time, it is
only with accurate ways of measuring these indicators that the system’s overall goal is achieved.
This distinct dimension of EI systems are known as thresholds. They are responsible for measuring
the frequency of occurrences within some indicator across a specified time period. For example,
while some departments may benefit from a longer period of evaluation, again referred to as
thresholds (e.g. more than 5 use-of-force incidences in a two year period), others may benefit from
a shorter period – especially if officer behavior is more volatile or must be tracked more closely.
With larger thresholds it may be argued that flagged officers will have a higher propensity to
having a genuine behavioral issue. However, these longer periods may eliminate the ‘early’ aspect
of the system altogether; relegating EIS to yet another reactive measure comparable to earlier
models of risk management (Newman, 2015). Conversely, a shorter period, while more timely,
may inappropriately flag officers with too little evaluation or simply capture officers during a time
of increased action due to proactive policing (Lersch, Bazley, & Mieczkowski, 2006).
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Walker (2005a) offers insight here in identifying different ways of creating thresholds:
Agency or department-wide simple quantitative indicators, peer-officer thresholds, and factor or
multifactor performance ratios (p. 32-33). To elaborate, simple quantitative indicators might be
something like identifying any officer with 5 or more citizen complaints in a 30-day period. This
method addresses behavior in a way which tracks the frequency of indicators of an officer over
some designated span of time. Ideally these indicators would be created to be effective evaluations
relative to the departmental policy and in consideration of things such as frequency of calls for
service and how active the department is as a whole. This type of threshold creation is the simplest
and representative of early creations of EI systems (Walker, 2005a).
The second means of establishing thresholds mentioned above, peer officer averages,
concentrate on officers on varying shifts or in varying jurisdictions and the fact that they may deal
with dissimilar situations requiring unique accommodations in oversight (Walker, 2005a). For
example, within the Orlando Police Department (OPD) it could be said that officers stationed in
the downtown Orlando area, known as sectors D and F, experience higher rates of violent crime
than their counterparts in more rural sectors (Neighborhood Scout, 2016). See Appendix B for full
diagram of OPD sectors based on (City of Orlando, 2014). As a result they may come into contact
with more situations where use of force is employed or arrests occur. Some have criticized this
method as comparing ‘apples to apples’ which suggests that should those officers being compared
to one another have the same behavioral issues none will be flagged nor will severe problem
officers stand out as they should. Further, the point has been made that the acceptance of differing
behavior as natural when working in a higher crime area may foster a simple myth which stifles
proper training and intervention when needed (Stephens, 2011). On the other hand, this method
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implements safeguards to prevent unnecessary interference with officers who are flagged merely
because of their special assignment or because of their productivity or high call volume (Lersch,
et al., 2006).
The last is performance indicator ratios which pose two factors against each other to isolate
behavior which is problematic. This allows for a distinction between things such as high
performing officers and those who are acting inappropriately – like when we create a ratio of useof-force reports versus amount of arrests (Walker, 2005a).
Performance indicator ratios may hold the largest potential. This will be especially so in
comprehensive systems which implement broader factors in need of joint consideration to develop
accurate analyses. As capabilities grow, these types of thresholds will allow multiple factors to be
considered in succession as well as varying combinations of those same factors. In this way, insight
can be given to multiple aspects of officer behavior. For example, combining an officer’s report
writing, vacation time, sick time, and time taken in succession may show a trend towards the
officer’s apathy for his workplace, department, supervisor, or any number of reasons for an
increased absence of mind and presence. At the same time, vacation time or sick time coupled with
things such as an officer involved shooting or officer discharges may uncover a trend towards an
emotional battering experienced by the officer due to some traumatic event. As many EI systems
are seen as data management tools with administrators as their miners, it is important that the data
be as flexible as possible so that supervisors and management may use their own wit and
experience to exhaust its potential. Alternatively, other options might include quantitative data that
is not simply compared to a particular threshold but that is combined in ways to show the level of
proneness an officer has for a decline in acceptable behaviors. Thus, not only are administrators
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given notice of a need for intervention, but they can observe a trend towards that notice to allow
them to act even more effectively. At the same time, they may also observe the trend reverse,
resulting in no need for intervention despite a few hiccups along the way.
A frequency of any one indicator cannot be oversimplified to come to represent the bad
and good in an officer. Instead it will always require further examination (McCluskey & Terrill,
2002). By relying on such strict interpretations of the data collected, done in an attempt to be
uniform and concise, these systems have begun cheating their own potential. It might be well to
argue that ultimately the decision will remain with the supervisors in charge of reviewing said data
to instead prevent these issues, but the goal remains: to make data as efficient, flexible, and
conducive to EI systems as possible. If we revisit Lersch et al. (2009), we notice they have already
ventured into this territory. During their study, not only did they create a weighted factor which
aided in more accurate portrayals of at-risk officers, their specificity in quantifying use of force
lent itself to ensuring the variable was properly utilized. That is to say that it automatically
accounted for issues such as increased levels of force due to accompanying levels of resistance.
Point being: a measure which was weighted and statistically crafted automatically became more
valid for the purposes of EI systems in that it accounted for previously cited weaknesses of the
statistic. Beyond this, when comparing their data analysis to those officers flagged by the EI system
under study they found that the results were nearly opposite. Those officers flagged did in fact
incur more uses of force and may have benefitted from some intervention, but the data showed
each time they used less force than the accompanying resistance experienced (p. 119-121). On the
other hand, some officers using excessive force as compared to resistance encountered were not
flagged as they had fewer uses of force altogether. Perhaps, and the authors make this point, it is
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the fact that they have experienced less resistant-driven situations that they are less experienced in
enacting force (p. 120). Regardless, the point is that many factors in EI systems would do well to
be calculated in this way or in a similar nature to create more effective data analysis and timely
intervention strategies.
Other more recent research endeavors even make mention of machine–learning
algorithms, a concept at the center of some new initiatives enacted by recent presidential directives
(Smith & Austin, 2015). In fact, machine-learning algorithms and technologies are booming in
and of themselves. As of now they are already employed for tasks such as making web searches
more relevant and blood tests more accurate to dating services being more likely to find you a
potential mate (Yaser, 2012, p. 78). The concept operates on an availability of data in which
computer programs find consistencies in data and patterns to create decisions in the best interest
of the client. For those programs which are successful, many have rivaled experts in their
respective fields despite the scientists themselves having no prior knowledge on the subject area.
These programs often use operating principles such as supervised learning, reinforcement learning,
or unsupervised learning (Yaser, 2012). To understand the different types of algorithm based
learning, the concept itself must first be understood. The basic operating principle is that an
automated system will sift through data and aggregate it when possible to identify synonymous
traits or patterns. It will then utilize these groupings to make larger patterns for the data toward
some end – usually a prediction or consultation on some subject area (Yaser, 2012).
Supervised learning installs a researcher into the process who will curb those patterns in a
way so that each prediction is given a correct answer to allow the system to calculate future
algorithms more accurately. In this way the system will not spin out of control creating more and
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more abstract predictors that inject spuriousness, invalid groupings, or anything similar. A
reinforcement learning approach is similar in that a researcher is involved during the process.
However, this time around the researcher will reinforce the more accurate and successful
algorithms so that the system may continually evolve based on those selected performances. This
method will move progressively to reinforce decisions at varying stages once they have been
reinforced in the prior. For example, if the system were to approach issue A and is reinforced to
outcomes one and two it would then continue to delineate other processes based on those two
routes from A to the next point of contention: B. In data sets with lesser prior knowledge a
researcher may turn to the last form: unsupervised learning. In this way there are no existing
assumptions about the data to guide the researcher in selecting more positive processes. Instead
the data is freely analyzed by the system until it has created varying groupings to which the
researchers may move forward in modifying to establish how the data is learned from (Yaser,
2012).
The overall point is that technologically driven solutions such as this may help in crafting
more accurate EI systems. In fact, these types of systems have been in place for this very reason
in other subject areas ranging from movie preferences offered to users of Netflix to those selected
as reliable borrowers by creditors. There have even been implementations of these types of systems
to criminal justice already. For instance, BLUE PALMS, implemented by the Miami-Dade Police
Department, utilized a similar system to help predict suspect lists for cases with few leads or prior
cold cases (International Business Machines Corporation [IBM], 2013). By analyzing key details
of any one investigation, the system develops leads which it then operationalizes into a suspect list
ranging from most likely to least. Many systems already organized to perform such tasks, including
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those used in the realm of criminal justice, all bare an eerily similar purpose as does EI systems.
Even more interesting is that many had previously been dependent on things of which EI systems
are currently contending with: buy-in, trust, and proving their credibility and efficacy (IBM, 2013).
Again, the point must be made that many of these systems have seen success and have led to
analytically driven policing which has a long established history of success and innovation,
whether that be through newer systems like BLUE PALMS, or older analytics such as crime hot
spots. Police executives need to be more forthcoming about their needs and more open-minded to
technological solutions more so than they already are. They need to begin operating as agencies
which need technological solutions rather than personnel solutions so that EI systems can begin to
operate as they need to in a realm with the most potential: technology, quantitative data, and
algorithm based analysis.

How to Review Data for Recommendations of Intervention
What to do once indicators are in place also deserves attention. Just as uniformity does not
exist in what indicators are used to track officer behavior, how collected data is reviewed by
personnel is also developing. Many factors must be considered when collecting data in the first
place and reliability on system generated flags alone may not be enough. While some suggest
immediate referrals to informal intervention for those officers flagged, others propose that the
officers’ supervisor be notified to review those flags first (Stephens, 2011). Regardless of the
method, explored in more depth later, these referrals will ultimately lead to the officer being
subject to some corrective action for their negative behavior. As expected, these are termed
interventions.
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Presently, although not originally, these interventions have taken a remedial stance. Bertoia
(2008) describes in his work how this type of approach makes more sense as opposed to punitive
measures. He explains that based on the purpose of EI systems, meant to remedy issues in an
informal context, remedial interventions are better served to making officers feel more comfortable
admitting a problem, more conducive to rehabilitative functions, and more likely to foster positive
connections between officers and supervisors or management (p. 5). Paoline et al. (2015) have
found interventions which are in line with this philosophy, to include: counseling by an immediate
supervisor, professional, or other command staff, additional training (on policy, tactics, or ethical
considerations), or peer office support and crisis intervention teams. In fact, 89.3% of the
departments they surveyed utilized counseling with an immediate supervisor. Walker (2005a) has
stated intervention, with regard to supervisors, should entail a “combination of coach[ing] and
train[ing], providing a delicate mix of support, criticism, and help” (p. 12). Bertoia (2008), lists
possible interventions to include: coaching, mentoring, training and development, increased
supervision, counselling, professional development, and change of shift (p. 5). As it can be seen,
a common theme of training, counseling, and coaching permeate the intervention processes of EI
systems. This makes sense as it is in line with maintaining functions of a system meant to curb
officer behavior before it escalates to larger issues of abuse.
While intervention tactics are meant to be predominantly informal and non-punitive, they
still encounter problems in implementation. Dempsey and Forst (2013) found that “many officers
avoid employee assistance programs [EAPs] as they are not private enough” (p. 178). Additional
criticisms of these programs are that they fail to encompass officers with certain issues as they are,
traditionally, meant for those with psychological, marital, or substance abuse issues (Walker &
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Alpert, 2000, p. 136). This is not meant to say that EAPs have no place in being utilized as an
intervention strategy, but rather, that interventions must be carefully chosen and accurately
prescribed and utilized.
Further, the above highlights the fact that these interventions require officers’ trust during
implementation to function (Ikerd & Walker, 2010). This is in spite of the fact that the notion of
EI systems have always been advertised as informal and rehabilitative. No matter how much it is
sold as such, if officers do not acknowledge these systems, or more specifically their interventions,
as helpful and not hurtful, intervention practices may suffer the failure of being unable to get
through to officers. This would, in effect, render them useless. As a result, post-intervention
monitoring has been created to remedy just that. These periods of observation, after the initial
intervention, allow for supervisors and management to ensure that the interventions being used are
functioning correctly and making a substantive difference in the officer’s behavior and actions.
Post-intervention monitoring is discussed in more depth in later sections.
Overall, the intervention processes within EI systems are just as important as being able to
accurately select problem officers. This is because if the problem is not remedied once noticed
then there is truly no point in the system as a whole. It has been noted here that a remedial stance
is more common among these interventions. While some may be angry with such a notion, upon
first exposure, it must be remembered that these intervention strategies are being implemented
prior to a true issue of conflict or abuse having arisen in a particular officer. Since it is the case
that these systems are to remain as proactive ones, there can be no real punitive measure taken
without some cost to the system as a result (e.g., degradation of trust within the system, loss of
informality, loss of reform-based stance). There does seem to be a larger consensus on what
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interventions may be used within these systems; however, there are still many questions as to
which interventions should be used and when as well as if these interventions are addressing issues
in officer behavior as needed.
Supervisory Control in Review Processes
Departments do not consistently utilize a single supervisor when reviewing collected data
(Hussey, 2002). In fact, depending on the type of system in use, multiple supervisors may even be
included. This is the case with the Miami Police Department’s EI system. When an officer is
identified by the system here his or her supervisor is notified and subsequently creates a
memorandum recommending some sort of intervention (Walker, 2005a). This is then sent up the
chain of command within its internal affairs department and requires each supervisor’s agreement
and endorsement along the way. As a result consensus throughout the organization as a whole
might be achieved (Walker & Alpert, 2000). Still, reservations about such practices exist.
Others, such as Stephens (2011), when commenting on police discipline, feel as though
processes which are highly bureaucratic like this invite animosity among personnel and weaken
the very purpose of them. This is especially so when decisions are continuously overturned or
disagreed upon. For example, were an officer to be flagged by the EI system, but not called for
intervention until six months later, he/she may be confused as to why he/she is being subject to
additional training or counseling, or feel as though it is unfair; especially if he or she has been
commended for his/her behavior since then. Another approach worth considering is integrating
support systems to ensure proper management rather than the aforementioned bureaucratic models.
Revisiting Moore (2003), he provides an example with San Jose’s Supervisors Intervention
Program (SIP). The program ensures first-line supervisors are held accountable for failing to deal
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with officer complaints by referring the supervisors themselves to review by higher chains of
command when appropriate. EI systems could even take this proactive stance when ensuring
supervisory cooperation. This would further satisfy the necessity of first-line supervisors’
commitment as is needed with any police reform (Walker & Milligan, 2006).
In addition to issues of whether a chain of command should be utilized or a smaller group
of local supervisors, it is also still up for debate as to which unit should manage EI systems
(Hussey, 2002). That is not to say, however, that only one level of management or even one
department, such as Internal Affairs (IA), should shoulder this system alone. In fact, some of the
most prominent guides on these systems, such as Samuel Walker’s implementation guides (2005a;
2006), frequently reference first-line supervisors as the backbone of analysis in EI instead. This is
because these supervisors have the most interaction with officers and would benefit most from
additional tools in monitoring them. As it has been mentioned above, many supervisors will
already have a notion of which officers may be prone to certain issues and will combine that
intuition and expertise with additional information gathered by EI systems. To further this point,
consider Walker and Milligan’s (2006) concept of early – early intervention. In their guide for
chief executives, they mention that many in management feel the keen eye of a supervisor is the
first defense and that any officer who has not been noticed prior to being flagged by the EI system
proposes a weakness in management (p.15).
Due to the fact that the primary responsibility of first-line supervisors should remain as
being in contact with their officers, it may be possible to off-load EI system responsibilities to
higher levels of management. The reason for this is that many have criticized these systems as
taking supervisors out of the field and placing them behind their desks more often. These critics
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equate implementation of EI systems as damaging to a supervisor’s ability to be in touch with
officer behavior. Perhaps a divided control of EI systems may be in order. For example, first-line
supervisors could have access to these systems, while at the same time allowing higher levels of
management to bear responsibility for them. In this way, first-line supervisors may access the
systems should they need to (something which should be stressed by upper management), while
also allowing for higher ups to review data and consult with first-line supervisors on officers they
may have missed. At the same time, first-line supervisors are tasked with less administrative work
which positions EI systems as something which aids them without any possibility of keeping them
from interacting with officers as well.
Other alternatives may be a shared responsibility between IA, first-line supervisors, and
upper-management in an effort to maintain a high level of communication (Bertoia, 2008).
Especially since miscommunication has been cited by some as another impediment to proper
implementation of these systems (Ikerd & Walker, 2010). By having joint responsibility in these
systems, departments may find it easier to navigate issues of informal intervention alongside
formal sanction with respect to officer behavior without stigmatizing the EI system itself. As a
result information can be fluidly exchanged between first-line supervisors and higher ups, as well
as with IA, so that decisions can be made in an effective manner. For instance, perhaps IA can
allow certain border line infractions to first be curbed with informal intervention, or likewise, firstline supervisors may elevate a conglomeration of smaller issues to IA if they believe formal
sanction is necessary. Due to the closeness of the departments in this manner, the proper decision
can be made as needed without any negative reflection on the EI system itself. Otherwise
management may be forced to navigate a fine line between what is the jurisdiction of informal
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interventions and when formal discipline should instead take their place. One example of such
would be an officer reaching a threshold for citizen complaints while at the same time being
referred to IA for multiple sustained complaints. Obviously it is the intention of those using EI
systems to prevent misconduct by way of intervention but it is plainly seen that there will be cases
where an officer is subjected to both the systems’ informal intervention and IA’s formal discipline.
In those cases it would be to the detriment of the EI system if both were to be utilized alongside
one another (Walker & Milligan, 2006).
Utilizing Formal or Informal Tracking in Early Intervention
What amount of documentation is kept in the course of these systems must also be
discussed. This documentation may either be that data which is collected by the EI system or those
files generated during post-intervention monitoring. While the principles of EI systems stress an
informal approach to intervention in an attempt to curb behavior, it may be difficult to extend such
policies to the entire process. In an entirely informal approach, lacking documentation may
diminish the potential of EI systems. For example, Walker and Milligan’s (2006) work indicates
that some officers have transferred supervisors solely to obtain one who was not aware of previous
issues. Officers did this in an attempt to avoid being flagged by the EI system. On the other hand,
a more formal method to increase documentation may stray from the intended purposes and goals
of the systems altogether. We are confronted with the contradiction of a system which is meant to
serve as a data management tool but whose contribution is meant to be completely off the books.
This begs the question: to what degree, if any, should documentation begin, and how should that
data be used?
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When asking how the data should be used, this issue of formal documentation not only
poses questions in regard to how these systems will be managed but also speaks to their
transparency (Office of Police Integrity [OPI], 2008). The simple answer would be the consensus
cited by many who advocate for EI systems: to utilize data so that supervisors may intervene early
as needed (e.g., Alpert & Walker, 2000; Walker, 2003; Bertoia, 2008; Arnold, 2001). However, is
this data being under-utilized? Documentation may put the public at ease should they have access
to such information. Terrill and McCluskey (2002) make mention of such information, instead,
opening officers up to liability claims, but this is a view in the minority. On a related note,
documentation may actually strengthen EI systems. In Phoenix, the Performance Assessment
System (PAS) widely recognized as one of the best in the nation, optimizes its system by making
read-only copies of data collected available to each officer (OPI, 2008). This added feature is said
to incentivize officers to enact their own self-intervention prior to being identified by the system.
In this way they can then modify their behavior as needed to decrease the frequency of instances
which would otherwise suggest their need for intervention.
Other uses for documentation can be shown by Luna and Walker’s (1997) work, which
proposed systems similar to those utilized by the Minneapolis Police Department. There,
information is published in regard to regions experiencing higher officer complaints, but withhold
individual identification. This individualized data is still collected but only provided to relevant
supervisors who are then able to administer informal intervention. Again, the data collected by the
EI system is optimized to serve multiple functions outside of early intervention, such as being
transparent to the public. In fact, many who propose documentation as a weakness to EI systems
are not wholly against it. Those who do raise objections can be found referencing systems relying
35

in large part on citizen complaint data (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005). Critics here fear that officers
may experience negative stigma and/or repercussions for complaints which later go
unsubstantiated. Regardless, creative outlets of data already being collected must continue to be
explored. When controlled in the proper ways, documentation may serve a purpose which is of no
detriment to police agencies or officers, while at the same time aiding organizational goals by
making the intervention system even more effective.
Another type of documentation outside of data collected by the system is that which is
created during post-intervention monitoring. Walker, Alpert, and Kenny (2001) offer insight on
the issue when they state nearly 90 percent of agencies utilizing EI systems monitor officer
performance after an initial intervention. Paoline et al. (2015) also found this same figure of 90%
with respect to post-intervention monitoring which they further distinguished between the 40%
whose monitoring lasted 12 months and 47% lasting 36 months. As of yet there remains no clear
standard on whether such monitoring should rely on informal methods or formal mechanisms of
observation and documentation (p. 2). This is because Walker (2005b) also advocates secrecy as
a strength of EI systems which would imply any type of documentation kept would violate core
principles of them. He states “No formal records of the content of an intervention – what an officer
says, any recommendation for professional counseling – is maintained” (p. 104). This is reiterated
by Alpert and Walker (2000), when citing the extreme variations which exist in post-intervention
monitoring as either highly formal or highly informal (p. 148).
When these systems do maintain a more informal stance during this process they are
allowed the necessary pre-requisites to explore even those matters which plague officer behavior
due to reasons personal to the officer such as financial struggles. However, as stated above, there
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is no norm on how documentation should be used in these situations. New Orleans and its
Professional Performance Enhancement Program (PPEP) has supervisors observe those officers
subject to intervention on a regular basis and file formal evaluations every two weeks for 6 months
(Andre, 2007). In contrast to the PPEP, the PAS in Pittsburg requires sergeants to conduct “rollbys” on a continual basis after an intervention (Andre, 2007). Thus no official documentation
exists. Further, Western Australia’s intervention system lies somewhere in the middle enacting a
relativist model where formality and duration of post-intervention monitoring, as well as level of
documentation, is determined on a case by case basis (OPI, 2008).
As documentation does progress, however, larger needs for storage of those files will arise
too. Whether that storage is created electronically or hard-copy, it must be considered how long
any one file will be kept on record. While it would be ideal to encapsulate an entire officer’s career
on file until the day she/he retires, this may not be cost-effective or even necessary in larger
departments. For instance, with other systems of formal discipline, even record of citizen
complaints, when unfounded, are only held on file for a specified span of time (Emmanuel, 2010).
Whether or not documents will be kept on file on a rolling basis (as thresholds expire and reset) or
will be kept for the life of the officer’s employment is another decision each implementing agency
will have to make. For those who choose the latter, they may incur higher costs both for
implementation of systems which can handle higher levels of paperwork or will require more time
to organize and store files as needed by personnel.
Local vs. Centralized Management
Although secondary review, discussed earlier, touched briefly on the issue of management
personnel and their relationship with EI systems, this section explores management’s role over the
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entirety of processes related to EI systems. How, and in what ways, managers will be able to
interact with both system data and officers is an important consideration (Walker et al., 2001).
Poor organization here can fail to empower the necessary supervisors or create
miscommunications which ultimately result in a failure to intervene or a lapse in ensuring that an
intervention creates a significant change in an officer. At the same time, how portions of EI systems
are split within high-command and first-line supervisors also affects their success. The term
“localized management” used here will refer to first-line supervisors whereas “centralized
management” is referring to those supervisors higher up in the chain of command. Bertoia (2008)
explains that “the key feature of the suggested management structure involves the separation of
three main phases in the EI System: identification, intervention, and monitoring” (p. 24). For
instance, localized management may be more reliable when determining what intervention an
officer would benefit most from but fail in be objective in monitoring that officer’s progress with
the intervention. In this way, perhaps optimal organization would ensure localized management
oversee the implementation of officer intervention, but centralized command to then be the one to
later monitor said officer’s progress. On the other hand, localized management may not be the
most objective when flagging officers who seem to need intervention, as Walker and Milligan
(2006) have found. They cite instances of officers simply adapting their style of policing to that of
their supervisor in an attempt to not be flagged.
The literature suggests that a buy-in is required by all personnel, but there are still mixed
reviews on whether a hybrid approach, as far as management, should be taken (Bertoia, 2008).
With a hybrid system of management, the workload may be split between localized and centralized
management so that first-line supervisors are not required to notate, intervene with, and follow up
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with every officer. Instead varying tasks are assigned to the individual levels. However, issues here
can include disparities in management philosophies, inequality in enforcement and treatment, and
inconsistencies in how the system is utilized. Should a singular approach be taken, we are still
faced with issues of accountability among management and communication if an officer were to
transfer departments or supervisors.
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Additional Considerations Needing Examination and Forethought
The Costs of Early Intervention
When speaking on the effectiveness of any program’s implementation, it is wise to keep
price in mind. No benefit is justified if the means of obtaining it are both inefficient and costly.
The Office of Police Integrity (2008) estimates costs of EI systems as high as $25,000 for those
departments which are 750 to 1000 employees strong. These figures increase with their
additional estimates on training and installation at $1,200 per day; not to mention the time it
takes for the systems creation (p. 14-15). The PAS in Phoenix, discussed earlier, is estimated to
have cost up to $375,000. These costs are incurred to obtain customizable software created
expressly for EI systems such as IAPro. To elaborate, IAPro is a software which allows police
administration to sift through and analyze data within their systems. Traditionally, as the name
implies, these systems were utilized by IA departments. However, they have increasingly
evolved to include EI capabilities such as customer-configurable thresholds, peer group analysis,
and the like (CI Technologies, 2007).

Despite the above numbers, however, the authors confidently claim that the system is a
cost-effective program in light of the performance improvements it sponsors and instances of
civil suits it prevents (OPI, 2008). However, for smaller departments that may have limited
budgets, there are a number of other possibilities to mitigate costs. For example, options in the
realm of software include what the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has
termed commercial off-the-shelf (COT) systems (IACP, 2006). Just as departments may mimic
ways others have implemented EI systems, they may too mimic the system itself. Although
certain changes will have to be made to tailor the system to their particular department, these
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COT systems allow departments to begin with a prototype. Once taken the department can then
make changes as necessary without having to start from scratch. They are also able to avoid
purchasing customized software packages like IAPro. The IACP does caution readers when
stating that few COT systems exist, but also promote this notion of being creative when
implementing EI systems and stressing utilization of resources which may drive down costs of
implementation (IACP, 2006, p.49-81).

In another manner, departments may instead tweak existing data collection systems to
allow them to complete the base function of any computerized EI system: tracking officer
indicators. In this way the department is able to retain computerized data systems without large
installation costs. A conglomeration of existing data collection systems such as this, theoretically,
can flawlessly and seamlessly compile data from several collection points into actionable data
which can be reviewed for behavioral trends in both officers and departments. As a conglomerate,
the new system makes use of existing processes and data to act as a data management tool. One
example is the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) who integrated 13 existing data collection
systems to do just that. From this the LAPD was able to create their own risk management system
which would be used to guide their EI practices. Not only did this system integrate the existing
data already collected, but allowed for the many automated processes such as automatic flags
discussed above (Sierra-Cedar, 2003). However, all of these systems may not have the added
convenience of automatically flagging officers based on certain thresholds. Nonetheless, they can
still aid as a tool to lighten the administrative work of any supervisor. As a result, the supervisor
acts more as an evaluating agent rather than a data entry authority.
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Another means of mitigating costs may be to create systems which are less comprehensive.
Regardless of whether they are computerized or not, systems may collect a smaller variety of
indicators shrinking all aspects of implementation – training, administrative changes, and the like.
Walker (2005b) even typifies this aspect of EI systems into two variations: large comprehensive
systems, and smaller more manageable ones. He terms the lesser Performance Problem Systems.
Although these have more limited capabilities, according to Walker (2005b), they excel in creating
more manageable costs for smaller departments who have no need for a large, comprehensive
system.
Existing Departmental Resources
Brief mention must also be made about existing resources departments may be overlooking
in their mission to implement these systems absent high costs or sweeping departmental changes.
Simply put, analyst personnel in departments have had a long history of aiding departments in
operating efficiently. However, few departments have yet to capitalize on such expertise. An
expertise which has long been in charge of predictive analyses for how officers are stationed, how
crime prone an area may be, and even solving cases with few leads (IBM, 2013). Yet, we see little
implementation of this expertise and its transfer to the creation of EI systems; especially
considering the only real tangible change is that the target of analyses for these individuals
transitions from the criminal to the officer. While it must be admitted that the system capabilities
generated by these personnel may pale in comparison to comprehensive software produced by
large tech companies, it can at least be offered for a start. Even if only serving as a solid footing
and idea cloud for future system launches.
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Logistical Considerations Expanded
Planning and implementation of EI systems has been continuously stressed during the
growth of these systems’ use. It is for this very reason that recommendations have been made to
consult outside agencies, departments who have previously implemented the systems, and experts
on the subject (Gibbs, & Kendrick, 2011). The concept of an EI system itself is not a difficult one
to grasp and, on its face, appeals to a very common sense approach to managing a department
(Walker, 2005b). As it has been explored above, the reigning philosophy is to create a proactive
and involved stance on proper conduct. Actual logistics of these systems, on the other hand, can
be difficult to navigate. Especially so as current research is still attempting to work out the finer
details of them.
Moving beyond the initial decisions of indicators and thresholds as well as each rank’s
responsibility within the system there still remains additional considerations. Many of them beg
the question: what will this system actually look like? A handful of EI system software programs
exist on the market today, such as BlueOrder, IA Trak, IAPRO/BLUETEAM, and Administrative
Investigations Management (Stevens, 2009, p. 511). Some previously existed as internal affairs
systems, now updated to have EI capabilities, while others have been created expressly for EI. For
example, IA Trak mainly exists as an IA tool but now includes alerts which can be set to notify
supervisors based on some preset threshold (Police Trak Systems, 2016). BLUETEAM,
conversely, has been built with the exact intention of being utilized as an early intervention system
(CI Technologies, 2007). As a result, it has additional features such as distinguishable data
elements within each indicator being measured (i.e. less than lethal force designation in use of
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force), peer-group analysis features, and an ability to collect more information overall (CI
Technologies, 2007).
Should a department wish to implement an electronic EI system, determining which is best
may prove difficult. As examined above, more comprehensive systems can come with a lofty price
tag. However, upgrading to a less-than-capable system can prove just as costly if no benefit is
gained. This may even lead to negative sentiments among departmental staff as observed in an
article covering Cleveland Police’s transition to an automated system. As Jeff Follmer, president
of the Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Association, states “This software is a joke. Officers know
how to reach out and get help. Why do we need a database or some outside tech group? What we
need are more cars and equipment that will help us do our job” (Atassi, 2014, p. 2).
Logistically, a department must decide at what point there will be an intersection of the
following things: needs, price, effectiveness, and workload. If a department chooses to keep handwritten records it may successfully implement an EI system absent large technological costs but at
the sacrifice of personnel workload. Alternatively, if a department is to utilize a more
comprehensive system it will have to bear that cost. Failure to make the right decisions as to where
each line will be drawn can result in too high a price for recovery (via the benefits of the system),
too high a workload for adoption of the system, or too incapable a system for success and continued
buy-in. Moore (2003), in his work, demonstrates just this when outlining varying strategies the
San Jose Police Department might adopt ranging from “Ad Hoc Supervisions Models” to a more
comprehensive “Personnel Performance Database Model” (p. 43-49). Within each class he
discusses both strengths and weaknesses with regard to their price, sustainability, effectiveness,
and short or long-sightedness. Overall, he makes the point that what may be viewed initially as a
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concession in terms of price, might truly be the wiser choice as opposed to implementing a shortsighted program or an incapable one.
Again, implementing an EI system is not totally reliant on computerized software. Hussey
(2002) echoes this point when he states that these systems can succeed with or without
computerized systems, but that they do allow for the benefit of supervisors to be able to access
large volumes of organized data (p. 54). If the processes of supervisory staff are modified to
accommodate EI practices then analysis of data may be mainly absorbed by personnel lessening a
need for comprehensive software. However, the increased workload for management staff may
create a loss of interaction with subordinates discussed previously. At the same time, as EI systems
continue to mature they will become increasingly complex. This would imply that at some point
EI systems will require a larger need for electronic processes (Hussey, 2002). That need may even
escalate to technology becoming a prerequisite of them.
If computerized software does not continue to become more sophisticated at a smaller price
point we may see a decline in the adoption of these systems. Unfortunately, many technology
companies require the endorsement of law enforcement agencies to even earn a badge of honor,
so to speak, just to be entertained as a marketable software. For example, Thomas (2002) published
an article in the Wall Street Journal covering a technology company experiencing just that. In it he
wrote how Angela Butler’s software firm nearly suffered bankruptcy as she personally financed
overhead costs of the company in an effort to maintain a contract for the successful implementation
of software needed by the Pittsburg Police for EI. Only after receiving that departments’
endorsement was she able to market the software to other agencies implementing EI systems
effectively. There is a possibility then, that a handful of technology companies will slowly
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monopolize the market on EI software while at the same time only filling those needs with
previously created programs that have been updated to be marketable as such (with new EI
interfaces). The point is, if the nexus of logistical factors mentioned above shifts, due to increases
in needs, existing software may make an intersection of them nearly impossible as either too
expensive or too incapable.
Technology companies should have a vested interest in maintaining their market with
police agencies and it will be up to the leaders of those agencies to ensure said companies are
creating the most effective systems at the lowest cost. The current inefficiencies of existing
software may be the result of a trickle-down effect of the non-consensus of the particulars of EI
systems; something crucial to any software design (Walker, 2007). As it is known, increased
research on these systems are needed. However, it should be distinguished that establishing the
efficacy of these systems is not the only priority. Those studies which will give more concrete
answers to best practices such as a go-to list of indicators, effective ways of setting thresholds,
optimal management, and intervention strategies and follow ups are just as crucial. Unfortunately,
information toward those concerns just listed are either sparse or scattered between unconnected
case studies. At the same time, it is that type of information that will later drive the efficacy and
sound implementation of these systems both from a technological standpoint and organizational
one.
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Guiding Future Research
Why Have More Systems Not Been Implemented?
EI systems have been listed as a best practice and highly effective both in case studies and
by renowned organizations (e.g., U.S. Department of Justice [USDOJ], 2001; IACP 2006:09;
Langworthy, 1999; Walker, 2003). Why is it, then, that a study conducted by LEMAS as recent as
2007 surveying 883 departments remarked only 39% reported they utilized an EI system (Bureau
of Justice Statistics [BJS], 2007)? Four reasons might be posited:
-

The agency believes it is not needed (due to size or their confidence in their
ability to monitor officers traditionally)

-

The agency believes it is too costly

-

The agency is awaiting evidence of the systems efficacy elsewhere

-

The agency defined its EI system differently than the survey or only utilized
practices of EI systems without a formal system in place

Sharback’s (2015) research indirectly disputes the first. While it is known that larger departments
may benefit from, or have a larger need for, EI systems, the data shown between departments
which implemented EI systems between 2003 and 2007 grew in all three department size brackets
(100-249 officers, 250-499 officers, and 500 plus officers). Percentage increases were 25%-33%,
41%-59% and 57%-73% respectively. At the very least, the organizations included in his research
suggest that the size of their department is not always a central concern when deciding to pass on
implementing an EI system. The next, cost, has already been discussed in this manuscript at length.
It has been shown that departments have many options to find a system which might work at a
price they can afford. Any unwillingness to implement the system based in cost alone is most likely
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being factored into a larger calculus of need and benefit. If an agency is serious about utilizing this
system, they have begun the conversation, and cost is something which can be considered
throughout that decision making process as needed. If the agency is awaiting an establishment of
efficacy the same argument applies: many sources exist which identify instances of success,
failure, and best practices which will grow possibility of the first. Of the hesitations listed here it
is most likely a belief that the system is not needed which impedes implementation. This may be
due to issues of feasibility, complications in implementation discouraging management personnel,
or just an overall hands-off approach as supervisors maintain traditional methods of oversight and
job performance. To those, EI systems represent a program that is not needed if supervisors are
performing effectively. Unfortunately, and at the risk of being repetitive, it will be up to researchers
in the field to substantiate the need and benefits of these systems so that it can then move forward
to improving and enlarging them.

How Might These Systems Grow?
Those in opposition of EI systems as something unnecessary or as accomplished by
existing protocol already are not completely mistaken. However, as other components of policing
continue to evolve as we have seen, EI systems have been established by researchers as the new
era of police accountability. These systems have a large potential which has been recognized by
many prominent groups in the criminal justice world (e.g., USDOJ, 2001; IACP, 2006:09). Many
scholars take a cautionary approach when hearing the word “potential”. However, if a standardized
and systematic approach to creating these systems manifests, their implementation can surely pave
the way for future reform (Walker, 2005b). As consensus and research on them grows, researchers
will be able to use EI systems as a vehicle not only to monitor officer behavior but also as a research
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tool, a source of consultation for policy, and any other number of things which could be based on
the data collected by these systems, data which will continue to expand as the systems evolve. As
a system which will continue to track officer behavior based on certain indicators, it can be said
that long-term data on a department’s progress towards fewer complaints, fewer incidents of
excessive force, and the like will be able to be tracked. For departments who are able to keep
officer data on file long-term we may be given even more insight into officer behavior, whether it
be specific to a department, region, or the United States as a whole. As a result we may see this
data guide more than simply localized management in curbing officer behavior and evolve to
changes in policy. While this is much farther off, and will depend on how popular and standard
these systems become, it is not impossible.
EI systems could be the gateway that allows departments of review and risk management,
such as Internal Affairs, to begin to operate more proactively. Further, the system could lend to
improving existing investigative policy when it comes to police misconduct, and over time close
loop holes in more formal aspects of police discipline to reform training and disciplinary action to
new levels of effectiveness. This is because the system is meant to detect trends in behavior as a
means of proactively addressing degenerative behaviors or weakened performance. In this way,
the system may also, separately, sponsor other formal aspects of police discipline to create more
pointed punishments (for actual departmental policy) based on violations incurred or more
comprehensive training so that officers going into the field are less apt to such deficiencies
identified by EI systems. However, it should be cautioned that while the systems use may lend to
such things the connection should not become so transparent that it sponsors a feeling of animosity
towards it. At such a point the initiative would be relegated to a point of mistrust, such as big
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brother is watching, and no longer serve its initial purpose of an informal means of sponsoring
better performance among officers.

The Utility of EI Systems
The utility of EI systems seems to be the golden question. As a result, many have set out
on trying to delineate the efficacy of EI systems and how they are being implemented – whether it
is to the department’s credit or just another reform with mixed results. Based on extant research
reviewed above it is clear that when these systems are implemented effectively and are organized
as needed they do well to assist in mitigating police misconduct or other failures (Walker, 2003;
Atassi, 2014; Bertoia, 2008; Fields, 2010; Gibbs & Kendrick, 2011; Moore, 2003; OPI, 2008;
Sharback, 2015; USDOJ, 2001; Stephens 2011; Andre, 2007). However, it is unlikely that these
systems will prevent every aspect of negative police behavior. In fact, given the nature of the police
profession such instances will still occur. One example of such may be the many split-second
decisions that are made on any given day which are unable to be regulated wholly. Where these
systems will likely be most effective is preventing those negative interactions which take place as
a result of a deficiency in an officer’s mental and emotional state or lacking professionalism.
However, for those officers that act out of character due to a flashpoint event, failure in judgement,
or some other outside aspect affecting their behavior, EI systems may not always be able to prevent
such.
Based on research thus far, however, these systems can very well usher in the new era of
policing and help facilitate a new paradigm of police reform. As policing continues to evolve,
departments will, ideally, become even more technological with aids such as body cameras,
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biofeedback monitoring, and the like. With technology like that at their disposal, EI systems may
serve as a computerized foundation. Were these systems to evolve to a level of technological
prowess that they could essentially predict officer behavior in seconds and become 24/7 monitors,
we may see them grow to a point where nearly any act of excessive force (or inappropriate
behavior) can be eliminated. Mark Fields (2010), a California Highway Patrol officer, describes
just this future, when making reference to developing technologies such as Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) monitoring systems outfitted on law enforcement vehicles as well as Smart Shirts
which can monitor a person’s vital signs – breathing, heart rate, and blood pressure. Perhaps future
departments, having already implemented EI systems, will see their capabilities grow to a point
where they can also integrate data from these types of technologies as well. Ideally, this might
result in real time threat prevention for officer misconduct. What was originally a system flag
generated by multiple vehicle collisions would now evolve to the system linking a history of poor
driving of a particular officer with real time data being collected by the GPS system outfitted on
his squad car. As a result, supervisors would be able to immediately contact him/her and question
why he/she is acting as such and may even prevent some error in judgement. Granted this is a very
futuristic view on EI systems, it is these types of creative visions that will allow EI systems to
begin as a functional system and evolve into risk management systems that may go unrivaled.
The utility of these systems have been proven qualitatively on certain case by case basis –
and yet research has still not reached a consensus on their overall credibility. However, what
should also be remembered is the potential of these systems. Thus, despite hesitations about
whether they are truly effective or not, given that there have been departments to integrate them
with certain success, it should be known that it is possible. Once this matter is settled, we can begin
51

looking at the future of these systems and begin to realize just how much potential they can have
as discussed above. Lastly, it is unclear whether comprehensive study of these systems will be
wholly possible. While research would do well to explore the amount of systems which result in
success, it is questionable if large-scale comprehensive study of these systems can effectively take
place. This is primarily because comparing each will be difficult as the systems are meant to be
created in ways unique to each department and in consideration of the department’s size, needs,
and relevant criteria for assessing officer behavior. Further, budgets relative to each department
are what determines how comprehensive or selective a system may be. Thus, without the aid of
qualifications or standards to typify varying systems, it will be difficult to discern commonalities
among them other than a general level of effectiveness experienced by departments across the
board.
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Concluding Remarks
The aim of this thesis has been to provide insight into what EI systems are, how they
function, and how they have manifested in departments thus far. The main components of them
have been discussed: indicators, thresholds, interventions, review strategies, and post-intervention
follow ups. There is still much to be established in how these systems will operate and it is the
burden of researchers in the field to deliver on this front. As a system which continues to stand on
a mountain of potential, the current lag in research may partially inhibit their implementation.
However, if criminal justice leaders (based on available research) are able to reach a consensus on
how these systems will be implemented, demand standardization of the indicators, thresholds,
evaluation processes, and interventions used within them, as well as the policies surrounding each,
and ensure that technological solutions are available and cost-effective, little will stop these
systems from evolving to even larger capabilities.
To elaborate, indicators must be firmly established; no longer can we simply evaluate the
ones in existence. Instead they must be carved out by traditional methods of predictive research
and increased scrutiny of how they might be measured as well as their potential limitations.
Opportunities exist in both forward and reverse engineering principles for these measures of police
behaviors. A balance must be struck between these indicators’ effectiveness and their limitations.
Whether this is an issue which will be solved with more comprehensive lists of indicators or more
intricate ways of measuring them is yet to be seen.
In addition, the thresholds used in conjunction with those indicators will need to be realistic
and conducive to them. They can no longer simply rely on the data but must instead contribute
ways in which it might be statistically analyzed for accuracy and timeliness. Frequency and tally
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based thresholds are out of date and impede an optimal EI system. Alternatives within thresholds
do exist and the more complex they become the more analysis will be available to the supervisors
monitoring them. These thresholds must be open to interpretation and allow for flexibility in so
far as an analysis of data. Again, frequency and tally based thresholds do not currently allow for
such. Better technological solutions may serve in aiding this venture.
To expand on the above, technologies aiding these systems need to become more
affordable as well as more capable. They will eventually be needed to sponsor the future success
of EI systems, especially as these systems become more complex. If the computerized tools at
supervisors and managements disposal have limited capabilities the functionality of indicators and
thresholds may be lost. Computerized systems can function as huge productivity boosters to these
systems but must improve their own capabilities and cost-effectiveness. It must also be decided,
perhaps respective to each department, what supervisors will assume which tasks and which
combination of them would be most efficient or helpful. It will be the responsibility of supervisors
and managers to conduct their analyses in ways which use the collected data in as many ways as
possible to forward not only increased accountability but any other aspect that data may lend itself
to: better training, better supervision, and better discipline.
As review and selection processes are streamlined and improved, questions regarding
which interventions should be used and which are most effective will become even more important
than they already are. It is key that a focus here is not neglected as the interventions will largely
underscore the relative success of these programs. Even if officers are flagged early and
appropriately, it will do no good should they not receive the proper rehabilitative treatments. Postintervention follow ups may hold the solution to ensuring proper intervention techniques and
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practices. However, how and how long these periods of observation will be conducted are still
being decided and are, currently, at the discretion of each implementing department. An increased
specificity here may aid the system in not misappropriating personnel time or concern if it is shown
how long an intervention need to be monitored before it can be deemed successful or in need of
change.
Overall, consistency in the views and perspectives of the systems have to be reached. This
may even result in researchers, for a time, being unable to say with certainty that particular
indicators or processes are completely correct in predicting negative officer behavior. While this
may result in unnecessary flags or interventions, as long as there remains an overall commitment
to maintain accurate predictions, departments will be able to remedy those as they occur. At the
end of the day the initiative has always remained the same: to be proactive in identifying risks and
or negative behavior among officers. Even if certain indicators are weaker than others, if the
system as a whole operate sufficiently and gets the job done, which equates to preventing officer
violence or excessive use of force, then the initiative has been successful regardless of certain
shortcomings in data. It is important that we prioritize beyond the smaller issues so that consistency
can be established and the systems can be implemented. Once this is been done they can, again
and again, be reformed and refined as needed to include better indicators, removal of weak
indicators, and anything of the like.
EI systems and their related principles make complete sense, they sponsor a common sense
appeal – it is their need for increased research, specificity, and unified policy that is currently
inhibiting their potential and implementation nationwide. The hang ups which continue to stop
their spread will rely on researchers to move toward establishing defined practices, definitions,
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and materials with regard to EI systems and their implementation. If all of this can be achieved,
with time and effort, we may begin to see one of the largest revolutions in policing accountability.
A change which will be able to grow with future reforms and serve as the necessary foundation to
bring about real and measurable change in officer accountability and behavior for years to come.
It is time to recognize EI systems as the credible and effective opportunity that they are.
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Appendix A
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Appendix A: Indicators Utilized in EI Systems

1. Arrest/Discretionary arrest codes
a. Number and types of arrest
b. Amount of resisting arrest charges
c. Amount of obstruction or assault on officer charges
2. Sick Leave/Vacation time
a. Excessive sick leave or abuse of sick time
b. Sick time contiguous with vacation time
c. Excessive absenteeism during holidays
d. Amount of tardy days
e. Other absences or discretionary time off
3. Complaints
a. Petty theft complaints by merchants
b. Allegations of sexual overtures
c. Allegations of misconduct (sustained or otherwise)
d. Prisoner complaints (during transport)
e. Inability to work with co-workers
4. Performance and Discipline History
a. On-going poor performance
b. Deficiencies in report writing
c. Ignorance of basic law
d. Cases not filed due to err in policing
e. Principle participant in incident
f. Missed court dates
g. Considerations and awards (including citizen initiated compliments)
5. Use of force
a. Number of incidences
b. Type of force used (may be compared to previous years, resistance experienced,
or levels of arrest activity)
6. Motor Vehicle Accident/Damage
a. Seriousness of damage
b. Action leading to damage (pursuit vs. traffic infraction)
c. Number of vehicle pursuits
7. Excessive Over Time or Off-Duty
a. Financial issues
b. Garnishments on wages
8. Officer Involved Shootings or Discharges
9. Citations Written
a. Traffic and criminal
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10. Inappropriate or Unusual Behavior
a. Unnecessary risk taking
b. Poor language or conduct
c. Poor use of display of weapon
11. Secondary Employment
12. Training History and Firearm Qualifications
13. Excessive Use of Alcohol/Drugs
14. Assignment History
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Appendix B: Map of Orlando Police Districts and Sectors
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